Sunday, January 14, 2007


These claims also ramify in relation to another constituency of thought and exploration,which in terms of the constitution of knowledge in Western academia,Is far apart in terms of their basic ontological and epistemological premises. This relates to the emergent discipline of the relationship of artificial intelligence to consciousness as understood by human beings.

The development of conceptions of reflexive architecture by Neil Spiller and other thinkers,in which architectural forms share subjectivity with humans,of distributed cognition,as discussed by Hales in her work on the post human,research on what is understood at the MIT Media Lab as ambient intelligence,in which reactive intelligence,intelligence capable of responding to the manifold cues that simulate consciousness rather than simply those that are encoded within a mechanical circuit,no matter how sophisticated, is distributed within a physical enrolment and is not limited localised within the human frame,and ubiquitous computing,envisioned by Mark Weiser,in which computing develops the pervasiveness and ubiquity that enables human consciousness to operate effectively in the world.

All these conceptions of the possibilities of human and non-human interface could be seen as related,although emerging from a different history of cognitive development,and emerging from different ontological and epistemological grounds,to the ideas of interaction between human consciousness and modes of being/consciousness in nature that are central to the work of Wenger and that emerge in relation to the work of Maltwood,particularly when this is examined in relation to the movement of revaluation of the relationship between the human being and nature to which her work belongs.
The work of these figures,their fascination with particular landscapes and the manner in which they have chosen to express this fascination,are integrated for me, in the theories of Dion Fortune,a thinker in the tradition of Western Hermeticism/in the Western Hermetic tradition. Fortune expounded ideas about consciousness,particularly ijn terms of/i relation to its relationships in the human being and in nature/particularly the vegetative world,that I have applied in an existential sense and the results of the experience of which have drawn me to the study of others,in this case,Wenger and Maltwood represent a focus for others making similar who are making claims similar to those of Fortune and on account of my experience in relation to,I have been compelled to investigate using the broadest range of methods I can readily employ/deploy,of which the methods of academic research represent one avenue of exploration.

Two poles intersect in the choice of these artists and theses spaces. These poles consist in the grounding/relationship of theses artists and their preoccupations with these spaces, to the emotive,imaginative and question asking orientation of the writer of this work as developed in the course of their lives. The second pole relates to the situatedness of the preoccupations of these artists to particular fields of knowledge,in relation to which their work can act as a focus for/a prism for questions and preoccupations that ramify not only beyond themselves,but which integrate a broad range of questions. The central questions of which are the preoccupations of this project with issues/questions of perception,both visual and cognitive,in relation to the human embodiment and the spatial constitution/construction through which spatial navigation is possible.
On another overlapping point of the horizon,a notion of simultaneity that contradicts the linearity,and thereby,of temporal succession, implied by a horizon. But I have not been able to conceive of a better metaphor,although Deridda's circle metaphor might be particularly adaptable here,is the particular context within which I am exploring this perceptual experience,its embodied and mobile affordances and its cognitive construction. That is the interpretation of two distinct spaces/different spaces by two artists,Susanne Wenger and Katherine Maltwood.

Why these two artists?And why the spaces they devote themselves to?
Wenger works in the Oshun Forest in Southern Nigeria while Maltwood was peroccupied with Glastonbury in England in terms of interpretive parameters that relate to other aspects of her work as sculptor and watecolorist. Wenger has worked principally in cement and mud sculpture,with her Nigerian collaborators,two of whom are Adebisi Akanji and Buraimoh Gbadamosi,while Maltwood has worked in terms of the imaginative constructiond constructed through the making of maps as well as the fraction of these in her more conventional artistic media of bronze sculpture and water colour. They have both written significantly in exposition of their ideas although Wenger is much more of the dedicated ideologue,whose written expression could be understood to stand beside her visual art as a distinctive achievement of its own in term of the metaphysical and poetic power of its reconstruction of a pre-existing/ preexistentent vision.
We shall also engage with ideas relating to the nature of space and of time and the bearing of these variables constants on the very constitution of the character of that world where such considerations are possible. They are constant because they underlie existence as we understand it. They are variable beceasue they change in terms of location and mode of experience.

Geographical constitution is not identical everywhere on the globe. Time could be understood both in terms of geographically determined modes of order,geography understood here in terms of the mater rail form of the earth,which even though it enables time to vary according to various time zones and the seasonal changes within these zones,at least presents a predicable picture.

On the other hand,time can also be understood in terms of a subjectively conceived response/construction,understood either in relation to the individual or in terms of the constructions of group,the intersubjective world shared by members of the same or similar interpretive community/reality constructing/construction community. A world without space and time would imply a different set,structure/sequence of questions than those we are posing here as an aspect of our interrogative framework.

The specific phenomenon this research project will explore is constituted at various overlapping,horizontally conceived aspects. In speaking if horizontal constitution,I am attempting to move beyond the notion of hierarchical constitution suggested by the notion of construction according to levels of meaning,of operation. I mean to imply that the various aspects of the subject/subject matter overlap,they imply each other,and that none is primary to the other in terms of significance or of constitution in time. None comes before the other. This understanding of phenomena would seem to be central to the our mode of investigation as inspired by particular understanding of being,by particular forms of ontology.

One aspect of what I am exploring is centred on questions of perception. Visual perception and its relation to cognitive perception. The relationship between the act of seeing and the act of knowing. And the manner in which these relationships are constituted in relation to/by the experience of movement in space. How does our movement in space,illuminating what we see and the sequence in which we see it,influence what we think,and what we understand and how it is understood?
Here,we shall enter into dialogue with theories of perception and of the relationship between perception and the construction of human subjective and intersubjective worlds. As well as conceptions of the relationship between embodiment and understanding,as constituted,for example,in phenomenology and existentialism.

I wonder,though,if one might not approach the question of how the world works from a sidelong look,a piece meal enquiry,that makes possible a penetration into the questions relative to that enquiry through a specific subject. Taking as a vantage point a particular phenomenon or group of phenomena in a specific field of enquiry,working within/in relation to the rubric defined by contemporary scholarly practice,may one not approach such a question.

One would operate like the poet who employs the conventions of poetic form,the structure of the sonnet,for example,not as a convention that hampers their creativity,but as a from that enables that creativity to flourish in terms of/under the discipline of form,rather than risk dissipation,on focused expression in a an expressive stream. I have read my precise interpretation in to Stephen Hart's words so as to suggest the particular qualities i aspire to. I suspect he might have interpreted the specifics of his words in different terms. But then,as i have already argued,discourse is partly about constructing meaning in terms of certain assumptions.
The central purpose of this PhD project is the search for meaning by the writer of the thesis,by its principal researcher,through/with the active collaboration of his research advisers. There are called supervisors,but it would seem that the mode of guidance he presently enjoys may be better understood as advising rather than supervision,since his guides are operating m,ore in terms of the Platonic notion of the teacher as midwife of the students own truth,capacity for knowing than the more modern understanding of the teacher as someone who imparts knowledge.Meaning of what,about what?Meaning of life,a unifying understanding of the experience of being,as can be perceived from his own vantage point and as can be thereby related to the experiences of others.

Stephen Hart argues that you can not discover how the world works in a PhD. Implying,I think,that the penetration of thought,the leisure for extended reflection, the scope of expression required for such foundational thinking is not the province of the PHD but is better suited to a more assured,less socially dangerous context,where the stakes of success or failure are not as acute. Since time is limited on the PhD. Particular constraints have to be observed. The candidate has to work within/in relation to specific academic requirements which might not always be compatible with the kind of quest implied an exploration of how the world works. Professor Hart made that point in passing while advising me about the choice of a PhD topic. His reception of my enquiry as to whether I was qualified to PhD in comparative literature at University College,London has been vital to my eventual PhD candidacy in that university. His response helping to redefine my self perception into that of a person who could gain admission to an institution which he had long admired from afar but I did not think he could belong to,with his present qualifications,at least no to the program in comparative literature.
Questions about the ground of being,therefore explored in this essay through the study of cognitive processes/inter-ontological/ cognitive processes, in the understanding that the interactive processes in which existential forms are engaged are made possible by the ontological constitution of these forms.(In this regard,see also edward wilsons biophilia)STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Is it possible to explore the meaning of life through/within /in terms of/the framework of a PhD?Is there any such phenomenon/does/is there any/ any such existent as the meaning of life?Can such a meaning be universalised as the way I have indicated it here suggests or it simply a purely/primarily individual phenomenon?Is the very formulation of the conception not itself indicative of a pressuposition that negates a truly creative quest?In other words,the formulation here indicates/suggests a distinct existent that can be cognized by the human person and p[erahps embodied within/in relation to a text?

This implies an effort to integrate the multiplicity of existence in terms of a unitary interpretation,an interpretation that can be communicated,marshalled in terms of a sequence of letters,themselves communicating the kinds of meaning sequences that letters are created to signify.Such assumptions might be unavoidable since assumptions about the nature of the world are what constitute the very vehicle of our communication,of our way of seeing that world,the very ground,the armature of our consciousnesses could argue that a central quality of self reflexive thought/thinking is the sensitivity to their assumptions,and the effort to deconstruct them so as to move towards what could be understood as less of an assumption,more of a truth that can exist independently of our own determinations. that again,is another assumption. That truth is. That the true is so to the degree that it is independent of the constructions of the human subject.
How can questions about cognitive forms-cognitive agents,cognitive objects/phenomena and cognitive instruments lead to an understanding of the nature of becoming/What do we mean by the nature of being?”Do we imply an underlying essence that all being shares in common?A substratum that would constitute the essential strand that would unite all phenomena,whether abstract or concrete?So,are we speaking of a unifying strand or a unifying ground,or of an originative ground from which all being emerges?

An originating ground,if it exists,might not be accessible by reason but can only be speculated upon,at least within the realm of ratiocinative construction. It would seem that any understanding of such questions is best understood as arrived at partly through the constructive efforts of the human mind/human cognition,in which the capacity to make deductions,correlations,abstractions,unifications of ideas and their relationships to phenomena is crucial. Therefore we would be speaking of a unity between the ratiocinative capacities of the human mind and the possibilities the universe offers for what could be understood as aspects of being that transcend the ontological assent/the sense sense of its existence/assent of any particular mind.

If there exists a unitary or unifying ground of being,does it not follow that the ground of each being which consist in or participate in or emerge from that ground?Would an exploration of the ground of each being the,not constitute an exploration that leads to what that being shares with other beings on its own ground?And since our exploration is woof the ontological characteristics or qualities that enable certain epistemological possibilities as these emerge in/through relationships between phenomena,may our study,therefore,not consist in an exploration of the ground of being through an examination of the ontological implications of cognitive processes as these emerge as mode of interrelationship between phenomena?
The/A central question this essay asks/explores is the character of the boundaries between cognitive agents,cognitive objects and cognitive instruments. We examine cognitive processes that problematise this relationship,transposing the character of cognitive agent from the purely human or even animal realm to that of the non-human or even that of the non-biological. This essay explores questions about the validity of such transpositions and whether or not these questions can be taken beyond the paradoxes that emerge in the relationships between people and landscape into broader areas /fields of cognition.

In what sense do the questions we explore relate to issues of the nature of being,to ontology. The are ontological because we explore questions that deal with then distinctive qualities of phenomena,including human beings,nature and the creations of the human mind,that enable particular phenomena to behave in particular ways,or to be capable of responses or to afford the possibilities for particular modes of repose to it by other phenomena,afford the possibility;/enable the possibility of of particular modes of interaction with it and with other phenomena that emerges in the cognitive process.

Theses questions relate to issues of modes of knowing and of the significance of knowledge,of questions about the character of knowledge,of how knowledge can be arrived at,and of questions of the character of phenomena that makes then accessible to being known in particular ways. In focusing on questions of cognitive process and the significance of knowledge,our questions relate to epistemology and the literature and questions that constitute it and the literature through which these questions are explored. In examining questions about the character of phenomena as this questions of constitution,on ontological identity,of ontological formation enable these phenomena to be knowable in particular ways or enable the privileging of particular forms of knowing,we explore ontological questions and their relationship with the epistemological.
why do you think this question is relevant,particularly in the light of all that has been done to address this question across the centuries across the world?

Perhaps because the effort and the answers are necessarily individual efforts and answers even though a comparative study of various approaches could be very is not moist useful through the development of relationships between divinatory epistemology and responses to sacred landscape,particularly as this is developed in the work of Susanne Wenger and Katherine Maltwood.

The essay examines ontological and epistemological questions that centre of questions of agency in the constitution of knowledge. It explores questions that emerge from relationships between cognitive agents,objects of cognition and cognitive instruments.

Cognitive agents are the subjects who engage if cognitive acts,they are the knower who develop apprehension of phenomena which they may be understood as knowing or knowing something about. Cognitive objects/phenomena are the object/subject of cognition. They are the phenomena about which the cognitive agent,the knowing subject,develops understanding about. Cognitive instruments are tools through which the cognitive agent gains understanding ,knowledge,about the cognitive object,the object of cognition. At this point in this essay,cognitive instruments are understood as the means through which the cognitive agent extends or exercise their innate cognitive faculties so as to gain or develop knowledge.

The cognitive faculties we begin our investigation with are the human cognitive faculties and the cognitive instruments we begin with are the means through which the human being extends the capacities of their cognitive faculties so as to apprehend or develop knowledge.
The study of responses to landscape,particularly landscape interpreted as sacred, foregrounds a pecularlrly apt space for such s tudy beceause it enable the juxtapostion of questions of the relationship bewteen huamn constructions ofg the sognificance of froms pf/asspects of rrelasity and the cxharcter that those forms of relaity embody in themselves indepdent of huamn interpretive construction,to the degree that sucxh an ontology can be cognised/grasped by the huamn awareness/cognniution.

This question emerges on account of the fcat that accounts of responses to sacred space often forhground a range of rersponses that include both areponse to what is conventionally undestood as aesthetic responses and otjetsc which could be better interpreted as aminimitic,in which asgency is atrtributed to thses lnadvsapes,or even when repondents do not commit themslves to atributing agency to them indicate that their intercations with tyhses spaces encpasulate more than what is coventionally undetstood as sensory reponmses to phenomesan and suggerst something mote in keepinmg with what is undetsood in nterms of either intercourse bretween forms of conscousness,in this case,the huamn and the nonhuman or evokes the sense of agenuis loci a sese of place that is both encpasulated by the notion of a asense of atmosphere and yer gpoes beyond it.

Ivakhif tentaively decrbiues such conceptiomns as what he calls interpertive drift whetre the interpertive responmses drift away from conventional conceptions of relaioty and goes on to vcharcterises such landscapes as heterotopicf spaces where conflicting interpreatyions convewrge andv whgich demostrtae,here revealing a sesnitrivity to the animistic sensivbility bith in the spitut of the scholar in the Western tradion,not commitimg homself to it a “non humn life which alternatevltel;y conceals and reveals itself in a pageant of place names and myths.”
Why landscape?This essay focuses opn the reseponses to lnadscape beceause it invloves imnteractions bewteen various froms of being in manner that provoikes/forgraouinds questions about the constitution of relaity in relation to the interprtreation of the individual ij relation to mthose of the interporetiove conmmunities-the communities of people who influennce their interpretaions-and the phenomena they inteepret.this tripartite convewrgencew would be relvant fro the srtudy of the question of the ground of ebing in relation to any phernomenaon since interpertive process necessarily operate in terms of this triple matrix.

Chapter 1:
A. Statement of purpose
This essay explores questions about/that centre on the nature/ground of being. While not agreeing wholly with Socrates that “the unexamined life is not worth living”since what constitutes examination might be identical with different people,and certainly might not be identical with the dialectical reasoning/ratiocination that Socrates worked with,we need to enquire/humans need to enquire into th grounds of what constitutes our sense of relaitry,/the grpounds/foundations opf wehat constitutes oyur rrelaity/our unbderstandiung of relasity as abasis for a frlexive exploreation of our eioxstence.Sucxh an exploration mcan be carried out susing the methods of various dsicplines and this particular enquiry intends to carry out that exploration through the convergence of avruous discplinary enquiries in trelation to responses to l;andscape.